Abstract: Competitiveness and carbon leakage are two central concerns in the international negotiations of a future climate policy. With more attentions given to border adjustment measures to address these concerns, it is rational to consider consumption-based national inventory to account for emissions embodied in international trade. In this work, we examine the impacts of a change in the national emissions accounting principle from producer responsibility to consumer responsibility on the national welfare, international trade, competitiveness and carbon leakage. By applying linear programming to a multi-region input-output model, we established a numerical model to analyse participation and non-participation in a global mitigation regime.
INTRODUCTION
The entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) divides parties to the UNFCCC into two groups by their obligations to domestic mitigation. Under the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I countries to the UNFCCC (except for the US) commit to collectively reduce 5.5% of emissions for 2008-2012 based on their 1990 emission levels. According to the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities", non-Annex I countries (mostly developing countries) do not have binding targets. This division creates differences in the strictness of domestic climate policy.
The US did not ratify the Kyoto Protocol due mainly to the concerns of reduced international competitiveness and lack of participation from developing country 1) . Emission reduction is costly and therefore can affect terms-of-trade. Industries in countries which implement emission reduction will face competitive disadvantage compared to their international competitors that operate in countries which do not have a quantified reduction target in place 2) . As a consequence, carbon-intensive production will be pulled to countries that have less stringent climate policies along with other economic factors. Emissions reduced in Annex I countries through offshore production and international trade will however generate elsewhere, in particular from developing countries. This potential trend of relocation has led to the concern of carbon leakage, which refers to an increase in CO 2 emissions in countries without climate policies that can be related to emission reduction in countries with climate policies in place. Reduced global competitiveness and carbon leakage can undermine the effectiveness of climate policy 3), 4) and have become central concerns in the debates of international trade and climate change and in domestic policy discussions in the US and the European Union (EU) 5), 6) .
Various policy measures have been suggested to address these concerns. Among others, the foremost policy option is to commit all emitting countries to control emissions based on "common but differentiated responsibilities" and national capacity. Based on the results of the Copenhagen meeting of the Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC, to conclude an international agreement on full participation in emission reduction will remain an intractable challenge. According to a literature review by Asselt and Brewer 6) , a strand of recent literature has focused on border adjustment measures varying from analyzing the effectiveness of border adjustment measures in achieving the stated environmental and economic objectives 7), 8), 9), 10) to examining the compatibility of border adjustment measures with the rules of international trade law 11), 12), 13), 14), 15) .
A corresponding issue related to border adjustment and carbon leakage is emissions embodied in tradable goods. 'Embodied emissions' refers to CO 2 emitted from each upstream stage of the supply chain of a product, which is used or consumed by the downstream stages or the consumer. On the one hand, the Stern Review 16) pointed out that although developing countries accounted for less than one quarter of cumulative emissions, over three quarters of future emissions growth will likely come from today's developing countries, because of more rapid population and GDP growth than developed countries, and an increasing share of energy-intensive industries. On the other hand, a large body of literature indicated that a significant portion of emissions emitted from developing countries is embodied in the consumption in rich nations.
For example, CO 2 emitted inside Japan was estimated to be 304Mt-C in 1990, while carbon embodiments in imports to Japan were 68Mt-C, surpassing those embodied in Japan's exports (46.4Mt-C) 17) . For Denmark, 3 CO 2 trade balance changed from a surplus of 0.5Mt in 1987 to a deficit of 7Mt in 1994 18) . Norwegian household consumption-induced CO 2 emitted in foreign countries represented 61% of its total indirect CO 2 emissions in 2000 19) . For the US, the overall CO 2 embodied in US imports grew from 0. 4) . At the multi-region level, about 13% of the total carbon emissions of six OECD countries (Canada, France, Germany, Japan, UK and USA) were embodied in their manufactured imports in mid 1980s 20) . More recent research shows CO 2 embodied in multilateral trade of ten countries (including Japan, the US, China and other Asian countries) in 2000 accounted for 13% of their total emissions 21) . From the perspective of trade balance of embodied CO 2 , the US had the largest trade deficit (-464Mt-CO 2 ), followed by Japan (-191Mt-CO 2 ), while China had the largest trade surplus (452Mt-CO 2 ). Another study 3) indicates that around 5Gt-CO 2 of 42Gt-CO 2 equivalent of global GHG emissions in 2000 were embodied in international trade of goods and services, most of which flowed from non-Annex I to Annex I countries.
Current national GHG inventory reported to the UNFCCC accounts for "all greenhouse gas emissions and removals taking place within national (including administered) territories and offshore areas over which the country has jurisdiction" 22) . This accounting method is based on a principle of territorial responsibility or producer responsibility 23) . The equity of the producer principle is arguable because the consumer who benefits from internationally traded goods produced in other countries should shoulder certain responsibility for the emissions emitted from production. In response to this argument, consumer responsibility and shared responsibility between exporting and importing countries 18), 23), 24), 25) or among upstream and downstream agents in a supply chain 26), 27), 28) are proposed to account for both direct emissions from consumption (e.g. transportation) and indirect emissions embodied in goods. If border adjustment measures will be implemented, it is rational to consider that emissions embodied in imported goods subject to tax adjustment at borders should be charged to the national inventory of importing countries 29) .
The purpose of this paper is to account for emissions embodied in international trade and examine how consumer responsibility will influence carbon leakage and international competitiveness associated with trade.
We applied linear programming to a multi-region input-output model to simulate international trade and climate policy for participation country and non-participation in a global mitigation regime. The next section explains the analytical structure, based on which a numerical model is provided in Section 3. Section 4 concludes this paper and provides a future research agenda.
ANALYTICAL STRUCTURE
To simulate the impacts of setting a cap on national emissions and a change of the accounting method from producer responsibility to consumer responsibility on international trade and emission levels, we applied linear programming (LP) to a MRIO model. 32) . The Leontief substitution type of LP model can help examine the substitution between domestic production and imports for a nation to optimize its value-added (GDP) under given demand and import requirements among other constrains. For policy makers who concern about processing trade and its relations to national economy, IOLP models can help determine the optimal structure for production and for exports. In addition, they can help identify the optimal spatial allocation of production and goods through international transportation under the constrains of various available resources. Since 1990s, applications of LCA and process analysis in optimization models have been developed to combine economic and environmental objectives 34), 35), 36), 37) .
We extended the Leontief substitution type of LP model to a MRIO model to analyse the substitution between domestic production, imports and exports in order to achieve the optimal national welfare under the constraints of technologies, emission levels and given final consumption requirements. By introducing different climate policy instruments, i.e. a change in national inventory accounting method from producer responsibility to consumer responsibility and an introduction of multi-nation cap-and-trade system, we analysed the corresponding reactions from both participation and non-participation countries in a global mitigation regime and therefore examined the impacts on carbon leakage and international competitiveness (in terms of (1) is therefore re-defined as follows:
where ) ( To reflect the non-perfect substitution of similar final products produced domestically and those imported from a foreign country, we simply introduced a minimum level of domestic demand for imported similar goods (Eq. (5)).
So far we modeled the substitution of domestic production and international trade to achieve the optimization of national welfare, defined as value-added. Next, we will introduce climate policy instruments to the model. First, national emissions calculated based on producer responsibility and consumer responsibility, respectively, are defined as follows: , increase with the quantity of reduction. This infers that abatement is a cost which will influence national welfare.
By introducing environmental constrains to the model, a country is facing trade-offs among domestic production, imports, exports and domestic reduction. Domestic production will increase value-added but contributes to national emissions. Imports will be the costs to national welfare but can help release reduction pressure, which is also a cost to national welfare. Exports will increase revenue, however contribute to national emissions. Domestic abatement will help achieve national emission target, but is a cost to national welfare.
When facing a combined objective of economy and the environment, major strategic factors provide alternatives for decision making. A change in the accounting method will influence the reaction of the participation country to an emission cap by the trade-offs between imports of carbon-intensive products from the non-participation country and domestic abatement. This will therefore have implications for carbon leakage and international competitiveness.
In
. Given a carbon price, the balance of emissions trading (= total sales less total purchase) becomes either a cost (negative) or an income (positive) which impacts the national welfare.
Considering domestic abatement and emissions trading, Eq. (7) should be modified as follows based on producer responsibility and consumer responsibility, respectively: (6)', and Eq. (7) or (7)'. National welfare is defined as total value-added minus reduction costs plus net income from emissions trading. ( 8 ) where cp represents the carbon price (given exogenously) in emissions trading. Major strategies to achieve the economic and environmental bi-objectives faced by nations in this setting include: (1) to produce at an optimal level; (2) to import and export; and (3) to reduce emissions domestically; and (4) to buy the right for emissions.
There are trade-offs among these strategies and a mix of these strategies implemented by the two countries will influence carbon leakage and international competitiveness.
A NUMERICAL MODEL
Based on the model introduced in Section 2, we set up a two-sector two-country numerical model on international trade and climate policy to examine changes in national welfare, total emission level, carbon leakage and competitiveness based on four scenarios. In the basic scenario, both countries do not have emission limit. In scenario I (S1), Country r has emission limit. National emissions are accounted for based on producer responsibility. In scenario II (S2), both countries have emission limit with Country r having stricter limit than s . An emissions trading system is established under fixed carbon price. Conditions set in Scenario III (S3) and IV (S4) are the same as in S1 and S2, respectively, except for that national responsible emissions are accounted 8 for based on consumer responsibility. To capture different features of participation and non-participation countries, we set different parameters for two countries as follows (see Table 2 ). These parameters are set arbitrarily based on the following considerations:
(1) There are two countries, r and s. Country r represents participation and a developed country, and Country s represents a non-participation and a developing country.
(2) There are two sectors, Sector 1 and Sector 2, located in two countries. Sector 1 is considered as a primary sector with relatively lower ratio of value-added and less emission intensity. Sector 2 is a manufacturing sector with higher ratio of value-added and more emission intensity. (4) Country r is more competitive in Sector 2, featured by higher ratio of value-added than that in s (
while Country s is more competitive in Sector 1 (
(5) Under scenarios II and IV (with a cap-and-trade system), both countries have an emission cap. Based on the principle of "common but differentiated responsibilities", endorsed by the UNFCCC, we set stricter emission limit for Country r, which is 5% reduction in its base level (387×95%=368). While for Country s, the limit is set the same as its base level. (8) As Country r is richer than s, household expenditure in Country r is much higher than that in Country s
(9) Production capacity is set at the level when the country has the maximum self-sufficiency (or minimum imports) and minimum exports to satisfy the final demand in its trading partner.
Applying the parameters provided in Table 2 , we applied GAMS algorithms to solve the optimization problem and obtained preliminary results ( Table 3 and Table 4 ). The simulation is one-shot and the results are much dependent on parameters. Recognizing the limitation in setting arbitrary parameters, we conducted sensitivity analysis on major parameters including (i) carbon price (increased from 10%-100%), (ii) abatement costs (increased from 10%-100%), and (iii) emission cap (decreased from 2%-20%). We conducted sensitivity analysis for each parameter at an interval of 10 separately while kept other parameters the same as their base levels (see Table 5 - Table 9 ).
On the one hand, to achieve the singe-country maximization objective of Country r (Table 3 ), the base scenario shows that r will fully utilise its production capacity in both sectors and maximise its exports to generate more value-added. Comparing four scenarios, most of the variables in S1 (an emission limit set only for r) will be influenced. In particular, the outputs of Sector 1, the total exports and national welfare of r will be impacted negatively, indicating that s is a potential winner and r a loser in a mitigation regime without full participation. Total emissions decreased about 1.5%, mainly attributable to reductions in r and adjustment in trade pattern, however emissions will increase from s, indicating potential carbon leakage.
By changing the accounting principle from producer responsibility to consumer responsibility (S3 or S4), most of the variables will not be influenced except for the level of domestic abatement in r and the amount of emission credits purchased by r. In addition, exports from s are influenced negatively because the carbon intensity of production in s is higher than producing similar goods in r. Comparing with S1 and S2, emissions from s under consumer principle will increase due mainly to the reductions in imports from r, which has lower carbon intensity in producing similar goods.
By introducing the emissions trading system ( S2 or S4), buying emission credits will be an efficient substitution to domestic abatement. Note: Date in brackets indicate the share of each country in the total amount of two countries for each item.  = Not applicable; r, s = participation and non-participation countries, respectively; X1, X2 = outputs of Sector 1 and 2, respectively; V = value-added; E = total exports of both intermediate and final goods; R = domestic emission abatement; ER = purchase of emission credits; Q = national emissions based on producer responsibility under S1 and S2, or responsible emissions based on consumer responsibility under S3 and S4; W = national welfare.
On the other hand, from the optimisation perspective of Country s ( Table 4) , most of the variables will not be influenced except for domestic abatement, purchases of emissions credits and national welfare. All scenarios show that Country r will be impacted negatively on its national welfare due mainly to the additional domestic abatement costs. In addition, S3 and S4 (an accounting method based on consumer responsibility) indicates an effective way to control total emissions and carbon leakage. Emissions trading system may work as an incentive to the non-participation country to mitigation and sell emissions credits. An increase in the carbon price will mainly influence domestic abatement efforts and potential trade in emission credits sensitively ( Table 5 ). In particular, rising carbon price will be an incentive to the participation country to abate more domestically and to sell more emission credits by taking the comparative advantage of lower carbon intensity. On the other hand, from the non-participation country's perspective, an increase in the carbon price will also be effective to stimulate domestic abatement efforts and sell more emission credits by taking the comparative advantage of lower unit abatement costs. Note: S2/r, S4/r, S2/s, S4/s = ibid; S1/r = Optimising r based on S1; S3/r = Optimising r based on S3; S1/s = Optimising s based on S1; S3/s = Optimising for s based on S1. An increase in the unit abatement costs will mainly have impacts on domestic abatement and the emissions trading market. In particularly, an increase in r's unit abatement costs will weaken its domestic efforts to reduce and buy more emission credits because of the relatively lower carbon price ( Table 6 ). On the other hand, an increase in s' unit abatement costs will also weaken its domestic abatement efforts and at the same time influence r's demand in purchasing emission credits negatively ( Table 7) .
From the participation country's perspective, a tightened emission cap in r will influence its benefits substantially, in particular the level of production, exports, international competitiveness (indicated as the share of domestic production in the global markets) and national welfare, while at the same time it will be greatly beneficial to the non-participation country, especially when a cap-and-trade system is not in place (S1/r and S3/r) ( Table 8) . Without an emissions trading system, emissions will be reduced in r however substantial carbon leakage will occur and the global emissions will increase. With a cap-and-trade system, such situation will change dramatically. On the other hand, a tightened emission cap in the non-participation country will slightly impact its national welfare and at the same time benefit the participation country ( Table 9 ). In addition, it will greatly decrease r's demand in purchasing emission credits. 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH AGENDA
Competitiveness and carbon leakage are two central concerns in the international negotiations of a future climate regime. With more attentions given to the border adjustment measure to address these concerns, it is rational to consider consumption-based national inventory to account for emissions embodied in imports, which are subject to such tax adjustment at borders.
In this paper, we examine the impacts of a change in the national accounting principle from producer responsibility to consumer responsibility on the national welfare, international trade, competitiveness and carbon leakage for participation and non-participation in a global mitigation regime. In addition, we consider a cap-and-trade system. By applying linear programming to a multi-region input-output model, we tested with a numerical model established for two countries and two sectors. Because of the limitations in arbitrarily given parameters, we conducted sensitivity analysis on major parameters.
Several preliminary findings come out.
(1) Without full participation of parties in a global mitigation regime, the participation country will be impacted negatively on its international competitiveness, exports and national welfare, while the non-participating country, taking the advantage of free-riding, will be a winner in a globalised economy linked with trade.
(2) A change from producer responsibility to consumer responsibility in a national inventory accounting system may have potential impacts on exports and domestic reductions in the participation country. In addition, when the emission cap for the participation country is becoming tighter, consumer responsibility can be an effective measure to restrain the trend of carbon leakage (S1 and S3 in Table 8 ).
(3) In a global mitigation regime without full participation, a cap-and-trade system between participation and non-participation can greatly help alleviate the disadvantages of the participation country (S2 and S4 in Table 8 ).
(4) Domestic abatement efforts and the emissions trading market can be influenced by carbon price and unit abatement costs sensitively.
In this study, we applied a simple IOLP model. It would be interesting to compare such a model with general equilibrium models such as CGE, which can simulate price, tax and different agents. In addition, instead of optimising individual country separately, we can consider to solve simultaneous equations of the
